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Access to and use of banking services across countries 
 




Abstract:  This paper (i) presents new indicators of banking sector penetration across 99 
countries, based on a survey of bank regulatory authorities, (ii) shows that these indicators 
predict household and firm use of banking services, (iii) explores the association between the 
outreach indicators and measures of financial, institutional, and infrastructure development 
across countries, and (iv) relates these banking outreach indicators to measures of firms’ 
financing constraints.  In particular, we find that greater outreach is correlated with standard 
measures of financial development, as well as with economic activity.  Controlling for these 
factors, we find that better communication and transport infrastructure and better governance are 
also associated with greater outreach.  Government ownership of financial institutions translates 
into lower access, while more concentrated banking systems are associated with greater outreach.  
Finally, firms in countries with higher branch and ATM penetration and higher use of loan 
services report lower financing obstacles, thus linking banking sector outreach to the alleviation 
of firms’ financing constraints. 
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1.  Introduction 
Banking sector outreach varies significantly across countries.  In Ethiopia there is less 
than one branch per 100,000 people, while in Spain there are 96.  In Albania, there are four loans 
per 1,000 people and the average loan size is 15 times GDP per capita, while in Poland there are 
774 loans per 1,000 people and the average size of loans is only one-third of GDP per capita.  
This paper introduces a consistent set of cross-country indicators of banking sector outreach, 
shows how these can be used to predict household and firm use of banking services, explores 
their empirical association with other country characteristics, and relates them to firms’ financing 
obstacles as reported by entrepreneurs.  These indicators were collected through a survey of bank 
regulatory agencies conducted in 2003-4 and complemented with publicly available data.  While 
these are rough indicators of access to and use of banking services, this is the first compilation 
and analysis of consistent and comparable cross-country data on the outreach or penetration of 
banking systems. 
Although a large literature has established a positive association between financial sector 
depth and economic growth at the country, industry and firm level,
1 little is known about the 
breadth of financial systems across countries, the extent to which enterprises and households use 
financial services, and their relationship to desirable outcomes.
2  This lack of knowledge stems 
mostly from a dearth of adequate data (see discussion of data issues in Honohan 2004b).  While 
the literature has developed several standard indicators of financial development, with consistent 
and comparable data available for the vast majority of countries over the past 40 years, to our 
                                                 
1 See Levine (2005) for a review of this literature.  Specifically, Beck et al. (2000), Rajan and Zingales (1998), and 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) provide evidence at the cross-country, industry and firm level.  Also see 
Wurgler (2000) and Love (2003). 
2 Some exceptions include the following studies that try to measure access to financial services (and in some cases 
its consequences) at the household and/or firm level: Francisco and Kumar (2004) and Kumar (2005) for Brazil; 
World Bank (2003b) for Colombia; Wydick (1999) for Guatemala,  Atieno (1999) for Kenya, Aliou and Zeller 
(2001) for Malawi, Caskey et  al.  (2004) and World Bank (2003a) for Mexico, Basu (2004) for India; Beegle, 
Dehejia, and Gatti (2003) and Satta (2002) for Tanzania.   3 
 
knowledge, before this study no such cross-country data existed for the penetration or outreach 
of financial systems.
3 
Yet, the importance of broad financial services outreach can be justified in several ways.  
The first argument builds on the theoretical and empirical finance and growth literature, as 
surveyed by Levine (2005) and the importance of a well-developed financial system for 
economic development and poverty alleviation (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 2004 and 
Honohan 2004a).  Financial market imperfections such as informational asymmetries, 
transactions costs and contract enforcement costs are particularly binding on poor or small 
entrepreneurs who lack collateral, credit histories, and connections.  Without broad access, such 
credit constraints make it difficult for poor households or small entrepreneurs to finance high-
return investment projects, reducing the efficiency of resource allocation and having adverse 
implications for growth and poverty alleviation (Galor and Zeira, 1993).
4  Second, one of the 
channels through which financial development fosters economic growth is through the entry of 
new firms (Klapper, Laeven and Rajan, 2004) and the Schumpeterian process of “creative 
destruction.”  This implies that talented newcomers have access to the necessary financial 
services, including external finance.  Access to finance for large parts of the population is thus 
seen as important to expand opportunities beyond the rich and connected and also as crucial for a 
thriving democracy and market economy (Rajan and Zingales, 2003).  The third argument is a 
socio-political one and sees access to financial services on a similar level as access to basic needs 
such as safe water, health services, and education (Peachey and Roe, 2004). 
                                                 
3 Standard measures of financial development include the ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP and the share of 
liquid liabilities to GDP. 
4 Capital market imperfections are at the core of theoretical models that show redistributing wealth from the rich to 
the poor would enhance aggregate productivity and therefore growth.  In the absence of well-functioning capital 
markets and broad access to financial system, it is this wealth redistribution that creates investment opportunities.  
Also see Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Aghion and Bolton (1997).   4 
 
Access to financial services, however, is not synonymous to the use of financial services.  
Economic agents might have access to financial services, but might decide not to use them, 
either for socio-cultural reasons, or because opportunity costs are too high.  Therefore, it is 
necessary to carefully distinguish between two different concepts when discussing the outreach 
of the banking system – (i) access and the possibility to use financial services and (ii) actual use 
of financial services.
5 
This paper introduces two classes of indicators that correspond to the different concepts 
of access to and use of financial services.  Specifically, we present data on the number of 
branches and ATMs relative to population and area, to capture the geographic and demographic 
penetration of the banking system.  Higher branch intensity in demographic and geographic 
terms would indicate higher possibilities of access and the opportunity to use financial services 
by households and enterprises.  To measure the actual use of deposit and credit services, we 
present indicators on the number of loan and deposit accounts relative to population and average 
loan and deposit size relative to GDP per capita.  Higher ratios of the number of loan and deposit 
accounts per capita and lower average loan and deposit amounts relative to GDP per capita 
would indicate use of deposit and credit services by a greater share of the population and 
“smaller” clients. 
Our sample of 99 countries is comprised of financially and economically developed 
economies as well as emerging markets and transition economies.  The first part of our empirical 
analysis shows the predictive power of our indicators by relating them to user-based household 
and firm surveys.  In particular, we show that our loan and deposit indicators are good predictors 
of the share of households with bank accounts and the share of small firms with bank loans.  In 
the absence of user-based survey measures on the use of deposit and loan services for a broad 
                                                 
5 Also see the discussion in Beck and de la Torre (2005).   5 
 
cross-section of countries, our aggregate indicators provide a good approximation of the extent to 
which household and firms use deposit and loan services, respectively. 
The second part of our empirical analysis explores cross-country variations in outreach.  
Correlation and regression results indicate that larger economies enjoy greater levels of outreach, 
suggesting scale economies in banking service provision.  Controlling for country size and 
population density, we also find that countries’ banking system structure, quality of the 
institutional framework supporting the financial system, and physical infrastructure explain 
cross-country variation in outreach. 
In terms of banking structure, our analysis suggests a negative correlation between the 
share of government-owned banks and measures of branch and ATM penetration, while we also 
find that more concentrated banking systems have higher levels of outreach.  The share of 
foreign-owned banks, on the other hand, is not significantly correlated with banking system 
outreach. 
Regarding the link between outreach and institutional development, we find that better 
governance and a more effective system of credit information sharing are positively correlated 
with outreach.  Finally, we find evidence of greater banking system outreach in countries with 
better communication and transportation infrastructure. 
The final part of the empirical analysis in this paper examines whether variations in 
outreach can explain cross-country differences in firms’ perceptions about the severity of 
financing constraints, which have been shown to be robustly correlated with firm growth (Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2005).  While economists conjecture a positive relationship 
between access to and use of financial services and economic development, this paper is the first 
to provide empirical evidence in this area.   6 
 
We find that higher branch and ATM penetration and wider use of loan services are 
associated with lower financing obstacles, even after we control for a standard measure of 
financial sector depth.  We confirm these findings when using firm-level observations and 
controlling for firm characteristics. 
Notwithstanding the novelty of the indicator database, it is important to be cognizant of 
its limitations.  First, unlike indicators used in the finance and growth literature, our data are only 
available at one point in time.  This prevents us from exploring the relationship between financial 
outreach and economic development over time and from exploiting within-country variation in 
banking system outreach.  Second, our data and analysis focus exclusively on two banking 
services, deposit-taking and lending, and thus abstract from other important financial services, 
such as payment and insurance, for which data are harder to get.  In addition, we concentrate on 
banks and, therefore, we do not take into account other financial service providers, such as 
microfinance institutions or cooperatives, due to the scarcity of data on these institutions.  Third, 
our indicators are crude indicators of outreach that do not take into account subtleties such as 
new delivery channels or more detailed indicators of loan and deposit size distribution.  Fourth, 
our indicators are quantity indicators and do not capture the price dimension of outreach.  Fifth, 
our indicators measure equilibrium outcomes, affected by both demand and supply factors.   
Finally, our indicators might be subject to mis-measurement, e.g. if bank clients have several 
deposit or loan accounts.  In spite of these shortcomings, we see this data compilation effort and 
the associated analysis as a useful and important first step towards developing more accurate 
indicators of access to and use of financial services. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the data 
collection and introduces our indicators of outreach.  Section 3 discusses the cross-country   7 
 
variation in outreach.  Section 4 shows the predictive power of our indicators relating them to 
household- and firm-survey based indicators of use of financial services.  Section 5 examines the 
correlation of the outreach indicators with other country characteristics, as well as regulatory and 
policy variables.  Section 6 relates the outreach indicators to cross-country survey indicators of 
firms’ financing obstacles.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  Data: Indicator Sources and Definitions 
This paper presents a new data set that seeks to measure the access to and use of banking 
services across 99 countries in 2003-2004.  Specifically, the objective of this dataset is to 
construct indicators of access to physical bank outlets and use of banking services (in particular 
credit and deposit services).  For this purpose, we developed a questionnaire that we circulated 
among bank regulatory agencies across countries.  The main questions from this survey focus on 
obtaining information on the number of bank branches, number of ATMs, and the aggregate 
number and value of bank loans and deposits.
6  For countries that did not provide responses to 
our questionnaire, we gathered data from alternative sources, including government publications 
and official websites.  A detailed list of all the sources used for each country can be found in 
appendix Table A.1. 
Our survey refers exclusively to deposit money banks – all financial institutions that have 
“liabilities in the form of deposits transferable by check or otherwise usable in making 
payments” (IMF 1984, p. 29) - for two main reasons.  First, in a majority of countries, the 
banking sector intermediates most of the funds in the economy.  Second, the banking sector is 
regulated and statistical information for this sector is easier to obtain and higher in quality than 
                                                 
6 We also included questions on payment transactions (value and number) and on the distribution by size of bank 
loans and deposits.  However, most countries were unable to provide answers to these questions; hence it is not 
possible to conduct a systematic analysis of these data.   8 
 
data for other non-bank financial service providers (such as credit unions, cooperative, finance 
companies, and microfinance institutions), which are often not regulated. 
Using data gathered through our survey of bank regulatory bodies and from other 
sources, we put together the following indicators of banking sector outreach:
7 
1-  Geographic branch penetration: number of bank branches per 1,000 km
2 
2-  Demographic branch penetration: number of bank branches per 100,000 people  
3-  Geographic ATM penetration: number of bank ATMs per 1,000 km
2 
4-  Demographic ATM penetration: number of bank ATMs per 100,000 people 
5-  Loan accounts per capita: number of loans per 1,000 people 
6-  Loan-income ratio: average size of loans to GDP per capita 
7-  Deposit accounts per capita: number of deposits per 1,000 people 
8-  Deposit-income ratio: average size of deposits to GDP per capita 
Indicators (1) through (4) measure the outreach of the financial sector in terms of access 
to banks’ physical outlets.  The data for each of these indicators, across 98 countries in the case 
of branches and 89 countries in the case of ATMs, are shown in Table I.  The indicators of 
branches and ATMs per square kilometers help characterize the geographic penetration of the 
banking sector.  They can be also interpreted as proxies for the average distance of a potential 
customer from the nearest physical bank outlet.  Higher geographic penetration would thus 
indicate smaller distance and thus easier geographic access.  Per capita measures of branches and 
ATMs are used to capture the demographic penetration of the banking sector.  They proxy for 
                                                 
7 In previous versions of the paper, we reported combined indicators, such as principal component indicators 
combining the geographic and demographic penetration of branches or ATMs and residuals of a regressions of 
branches/ ATMs on area and population.  However, unlike the indicators presented here, they are hard to interpret 
and imply certain assumptions about the importance of each dimension of outreach.   9 
 
the average number of people served by each physical bank outlet.  Higher demographic 
penetration would indicate fewer potential clients per branch or ATM and thus easier access. 
Both area- and population-based ratios of the number of branches and ATMs have 
limitations as indicators of access to physical banking outlets.  Most importantly, these measures 
assume a uniform distribution of bank outlets within a country’s area and across its population.  
However, in reality, in many countries bank branches and ATMs are concentrated in urban areas 
of the country and are accessible only to individuals living within or close to urban areas. 
Indicators (5) through (8) measure the use of banking services.  We focus exclusively on 
bank deposits and loans because these are the main services offered by banks for which we were 
able to gather information across countries.  In particular, we collected information on the 
number and value of loans for 44 countries, and information on the number and value of deposits 
for 54 countries.  This information is shown in Table II.  We interpret higher figures of indicators 
based on the number of loans and deposits to signal greater use of services.  On the other hand, 
we interpret higher values for the average size of loans or deposits to GDP per capita to indicate 
that banking services are more limited in use, since they are likely only to be affordable to 
wealthier individuals or larger enterprises. 
Like the branching and ATM indicators, the number and average size of loan and deposit 
accounts have a number of limitations.  Most importantly, one individual or firm may receive 
more than one loan or have more than one deposit account, so the number of loans and deposit 
accounts is far from being a perfect proxy of the number of people that use these services in a 
country.  Also, the average size of loans and deposits to GDP per capita might not be 
representative of the value of services that a typical individual might receive.  Nevertheless, we   10 
 
show below that these indicators are correlated with the underlying statistics we care about – the 
actual percentage of households and firms that use banking services in a country. 
 
3.  Characterizing Access to and Use of Banking Services Across Countries 
  Notwithstanding the limitations of the indicators presented in the previous section, it is 
interesting to compare countries across these dimensions.  Table III Panel A presents descriptive 
statistics of all outreach indicators, while Panel B presents correlations. 
The number of branches per area varies from less than 0.18 branches per 1,000 square 
kilometers (the lowest 5th percentile of the distribution) for countries such as Bolivia, Botswana, 
Guyana, Kazakhstan and Namibia to more than 119.65 branches per 1,000 square kilometers (the 
top 5th percentile of the distribution) for countries like Bahrain, Belgium, Malta, Netherlands, 
and Singapore.  The median number of branches per 1,000 square kilometers is 4.80, which is 
representative of the statistics for Estonia and Sweden. 
Ethiopia, Honduras, Madagascar, Tanzania, and Uganda have less than 1.24 branches per 
100,000 people (bottom 5
th percentile), while Austria, Belgium, Portugal, Italy, and Spain are at 
the top 5th percentile of the distribution with more than 49.74 branches per 100,000 people.  The 
median figure for the number of branches per 100,000 people is 8.42.  Indonesia, Turkey, Iran, 
Colombia, Kuwait and Poland have indicators close to this value.  Figures 1 and 2 plot the 
median geographic and demographic branch penetration, respectively, in five quintiles against 
GDP per capita.  The figure indicates a pattern of increasing branch penetration in more 
developed countries. 
In terms of number of ATMs per area, Tanzania, Zambia, Nepal, Madagascar and 
Guyana are at the bottom of the distribution with less than 0.26 ATMs per 1,000 square   11 
 
kilometers, while the countries at the top 5th percentile of the distribution include Korea, Malta, 
Bahrain, Japan and Singapore with more than 253.12 ATMs per 1,000 square kilometers.  The 
median for the number of ATMs per 1,000 square kilometers is 10.07.  The ATM per area 
indicators for Sri Lanka and Costa Rica are close to this figure. 
The number of ATMs per 100,000 people is lowest for countries such as Bangladesh, 
Nepal, Madagascar, Pakistan and Tanzania, with less than 0.58 ATMs per 100,000.  On the other 
hand, countries such as Canada, Japan, Portugal, Spain and the United States are at the other end 
of the distribution with more than 101.46 ATMs per 100,000 people.  The median value for this 
indicator is 16.63.  Countries such as Mexico, Malaysia, Lebanon, Thailand and Venezuela have 
ATM per capita indicators close to this value.  Figures 3 and 4 show that both geographic and 
demographic ATM penetration increases with the level of economic development. 
The median value of the number of loans per 1,000 people is 80.57 loans per 1,000 
people.  Indicator values for the number of loans per 1,000 people in Peru, Ecuador, Jordan and 
Namibia rank close to the median.  The lowest 5
th percentile of the distribution of the number of 
loans per capita is 6.35 loans per 1,000 people.  This includes countries such as Albania, Uganda 
and Madagascar.  The top 5
th percentile of this distribution encompasses countries with more 
than 700.56 loans per 1,000 people, such as Greece, Israel and Poland. 
The median value across countries of the loan-income ratio is 3.75.  The figures for 
Lithuania and Singapore are close to this value.  The top 5
th percentile for this indicator is 17.91 
and includes countries such as Belgium, Madagascar, and Bolivia.  On the other hand, the 
bottom 5
th percentile is 0.68 and includes countries such as El Salvador, Turkey and Poland.  
Figures 5 and 6 indicate that the number of loans per capita increases and the average size of 
loans decreases as countries grow richer.   12 
 
In terms of the number of deposits per capita, the median value of this indicator is 528.89 
deposit accounts per 1,000 people.  Guyana and Venezuela have indicators close to this value.  
The top 5
th percentile of the distribution for this indicator is 2,569.40, (that is, more than 2.5 
deposit accounts per capita) which encompasses the values for Austria, Belgium, and Denmark.  
The bottom 5
th percentile has fewer than 61.81 deposit accounts per 1000 people.  Bolivia, 
Madagascar and Uganda are among this group. 
For 50 percent of countries in our sample, the deposit-income ratio is below 0.66.  The 
values for Argentina, Turkey and Ecuador are close to this figure.  The top 5
th percentile for the 
distribution of the average size of deposits to GDP per capita is 6.40.  Indicator values for 
Zimbabwe, Madagascar, and Lebanon are in the top 5
th percentile.  On the other hand, values for 
Russia, Iran and the Dominican Republic fall in the lowest 5
th percentile, which includes 
observations below 0.11.  Figures 7 and 8 show the positive (negative) association of deposit 
accounts per capita (average size of deposits) with economic development. 
The positive association between GDP per capita and indicators of the number of 
branches, ATMs, loans and deposits is confirmed by the correlations shown on Table III Panel B.  
This table also shows that both loan-income and deposit-income ratios are negatively correlated 
with GDP per capita, although not significantly in the case of loans.  At the same time, Table III 
Panel B shows that indicators of the number of banking outlets and loan and deposit accounts 
tend to be positively correlated with each other and negatively correlated with loan-income and 
deposit-income ratios.   13 
 
4.  Relating Outreach Indicators to Household and Firm Data 
  How well do our outreach indicators predict the actual use of savings and loan services 
by household and firms?  To a large degree the usefulness of the macro-level banking sector 
outreach indicators we propose will depend on whether they track the micro data that we 
ultimately care about.  Regressing user-based data from household and firm surveys on our 
indicators of deposit and loan use, we show the predictive power of our aggregate outreach 
indicators.
8  Specifically, we use country-level data on the percentage of households that have a 
bank account constructed from different household surveys and compiled by Claessens (2005) 
and Gasparini et al. (2005) and country-level data on the share of small firms with bank loans 
from the World Business Environment Survey (WBES).
9 While the household surveys are based 
on thousands of observations, WBES samples on average 120 firms per country, 40% of which 
are small.
10  We therefore expect a much lower degree of precision and predictive power when 
relating firm-survey based user data to our aggregate indicators than when using household-
survey based measures.  While we tried different empirical specifications, below we present the 
model with the highest R
2. 
A regression of the share of households with bank accounts (Household share) on the log 
of number of deposit accounts per 100,000 (Ln deposits per 100,000) and the log of average size 
of deposits in US dollars (Ln average deposit size) yields the following result (robust standard 
errors in parentheses): 
 
                                                 
8 We are grateful to Patrick Hohonan for this suggestion. 
9 WBES is a database of firm level surveys, which we discuss further in Section 6.1. 
10 Given the small sample size and the size-stratified nature of WBES – 40% small, 40% medium and 20% large 
enterprises, independent of the actual size distribution -, we focus on the group of firms most likely to be affected by 
cross-country variation in banking sector outreach.  When we use the overall share of firms with bank loans or focus 
on small and medium enterprises, we obtain similar results, but at lower significance levels and with lower R
2.   14 
 
Household share = -2.103 + 0.160 Ln deposits per 100,000 + 0.189 Ln average deposit size     (1) 
         (0.278)    (0.036)                              (0.054) 
 
with 19 observations and an R
2 of 88%.  Both variables enter significantly at the 1% level.  The 
regression results suggest that a larger number of accounts is positively associated with more 
households having bank accounts, but in a non-linear way, so that the number of accounts per 
household increases as well with more deposit accounts.  Further, a larger average deposit 
account balance is positively correlated with more households having bank accounts; this might 
partially capture the effect of higher incomes as the use of deposit services increases.
11  Table IV, 
columns 1 and 2, presents both the actual share of households with bank accounts and the 
predicted share from regression (1).
12 The correlation between the predicted share of household 
and the actual share of households with bank accounts is 94%. 
A regression of the share of small firms with bank loans (Small firm share) on the log of 
number of loan accounts per 100,000 (Ln loans per 100,000) and the log of average size of loans 
in US dollars (Ln average loan size) yields the following result (robust standard errors in 
parentheses): 
 
Small firm share = -0.357  + 0.082 Ln loans per 100,000 + 0.042 Ln average loan size           (2) 
           (0.216)  (0.028)                          (0.025) 
 
with 26 observations and an R
2 of 34%.  While the Ln loans per 100,000 is significant at the 1% 
level, Ln average loan size enters significantly at the 10% level.  As in the regressions of the 
household indicators, both the number of loan accounts per capita and the average size of loans 
in US dollars enter positively, but in a non-linear manner.  Table IV, columns 3 and 4, presents 
                                                 
11 The average size of deposits to GDP per capita does not enter significantly in the regression. 
12 To avoid that the predicted value falls below zero or above one, we use a tobit regression to predict the share of 
households with bank accounts.  The coefficients and significance levels are almost the same as in the OLS 
regression.   15 
 
both the actual share of small firms with bank loans and the predicted share from regression 
(2).
13 The correlation between the predicted share of household and the actual share of 
households is 58%.  Given the limited sample of firms surveyed by the WBES in each country 
and the lack of census data on firm financing patterns, the predictive power of aggregate loan use 
indicators is more limited than in the case of deposit services. 
While these are preliminary results that have to be interpreted with caution due to the 
small number of observations, they show the potential usefulness of our aggregate outreach 
indicators.  In the absence of consistent household- and firm-survey based measures of access to 
and use of financial services, these outreach indicators can be very useful since they can be used 
to calculate approximate values. 
 
5.  Explaining Outreach 
What explains the large variations in outreach indicators across countries? Do 
institutional quality, regulatory policies, physical infrastructure, and the market structure of the 
banking system play a role?  This section explores the empirical relation between our outreach 
indicators and an array of potential explanatory variables; Appendix Table A.2 presents 
descriptive statistics of the different country variables.  Table V provides correlations between all 
of our outreach indicators and the explanatory variables, while Tables VI–IX report regression 
results of the different outreach indicators on (i) population density, (ii) economic size of the 
country, and (iii) one country characteristic at a time.  In Tables VI-IX, we separate country 
characteristics by type, distinguishing between those measuring institutional quality (Table VI), 
credit information sharing and banking freedom (Table VII), banking system structure (Table 
VIII) and physical infrastructure (Table IX). 
                                                 
13 As in the case of regression (1), we use a tobit regression to predict the share of small firms with bank loans.     16 
 
Our estimations yield a number of interesting results.  First, we find a strong positive 
association of higher outreach with the traditional indicators of financial development (Table 
V).
14  Specifically, we find a positive and significant correlation of private credit to GDP, liquid 
liabilities to GDP and total deposits to GDP with all our indicators, with the notable exception of 
loan-income and deposit-income ratios.  Also, it does not appear to be the case that greater 
outreach comes at the expense of higher overhead costs to total assets or higher interest 
margins.
15  
Second, not surprisingly, we find outreach to be correlated with population density and 
economic size.  In particular, more densely populated countries have higher geographic branch 
and ATM penetration, while there is no robust correlation with the indicators measuring 
demographic penetration of bank outlets and the indicators measuring the use of banking 
services.  This is confirmed by the regressions in Tables VI-IX.  At the same time, we find that 
larger economies have higher bank and ATM penetration and show higher use of loan and 
deposit services.  This suggests economies of scale in banking service delivery.
16  
Third, the positive association of institutional and financial development extends to the 
access to and use of banking services (Table VI).
17  Here we use as one of our measures of 
institutional quality the Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003) Governance Index, which 
averages six sub-indices measuring rule of law, control of corruption, voice and accountability, 
political stability, government effectiveness and regulatory quality.  Further, we use the Heritage 
Foundation Index of Barriers to Economic Freedom - an average of ten sub-indices including 
                                                 
14 We do not include the financial sector indicators in the regressions, since unlike for the other variables, there is a 
strong case for bi-directional causality, which might bias the OLS coefficients and renders interpretation 
problematic.   
15 This interpretation has to be taken with a grain of salt since the correlations might also indicate that sectors that 
provide greater outreach are more competitive and therefore margins are lower as a result.   
16 Only when we control for communication infrastructure (Table IX), does economic size turn insignificant. 
17 For an overview of the importance of legal institutions for financial development, see Beck and Levine (2005).   17 
 
barriers to property rights and barriers to banking freedom - and the Cost of Contract 
Enforcement indicator from the Doing Business database.  While higher values of the 
Governance Index indicate a more effective institutional environment, higher values of Barriers 
to Economic Freedom and Cost of Contract Enforcement indicate a less developed institutional 
framework.  The correlations suggest a positive relationship between access to and use of 
banking services and better governance, contract enforcement and economic freedom.  These 
correlations are confirmed for the Governance Index by the regressions in Tables VI.  The 
Governance Index enters positively and significantly in all but the loan-income ratio regressions.  
The Barriers to Economic Freedom indicator enters negatively and significantly (5% level) only 
in four of them.  Finally, the cost of contract enforcement indicator is negative and significant in 
only three of the eight regressions.  Overall, the Table VI regressions suggest a strong 
association of better institutional quality with banking sector outreach, but it is more difficult to 
disentangle the specific elements of the institutional framework that are associated with different 
dimensions of outreach.   
Fourth, there is some indication that more effective credit information sharing and fewer 
restrictions on banks’ activities are associated with better access, while high entry barriers are 
associated with lower use of lending and deposit services (Table VII).  Correlations and 
regression results suggest that in countries with more effective credit information sharing, banks 
have relatively more outlets, but do not necessarily extend more loans.  The indicator on 
Restrictions on Bank Activities only enters negatively and significantly in the branch penetration 
regressions, suggesting that banks are less likely to expand their branch network if they are 
restricted to their core business of deposit taking and lending.  The indicator of Entry into   18 
 
Banking Requirements enters negatively and significantly in the regression of loans per capita, 
providing some evidence that limiting entry results in a lower use of credit services. 
Fifth, the Share of Assets in Government-Owned Banks is negatively associated with 
demographic branch and ATM penetration, while more concentrated banking systems provide 
more outlets and show higher use of deposit services (Table VIII).  In spite of the often explicit 
mandate of government-owned banks to expand outreach, the correlation and regressions suggest 
that banking systems dominated by government-owned banks actually have less branch and 
ATM penetration.  The Share of Assets in Foreign-Owned Banks is not significantly correlated 
with our outreach indicators.  Thus, these regressions do not support frequently upheld views that 
government-owned banks help improve outreach while foreign-dominated banking sectors might 
see a worsening of outreach since foreign banks tend to cherry-pick the best and often wealthiest 
customers.  The Concentration ratio, finally, is positively correlated with the branch, ATM and 
the deposit indicators, suggesting that banks in more concentrated banking systems have a higher 
penetration of physical outlets and extend deposit services to more clients.   
Finally, better communication and transport infrastructure is positively associated with 
access to and use of banking services (Table IX).  Better infrastructure reduces the cost of 
banking service delivery and makes the extension of bank outlets more cost-effective, thus 
increasing the use of banking services.  We use two indicators of physical infrastructure – 
Telephone Mainlines per Capita to proxy for the communication infrastructure and Rail km per 
100 km
2 to proxy for the transportation infrastructure.
18  The positive correlation of infrastructure 
with outreach comes out not only in the correlations in Table V, but also in the regressions of 
Table IX, where we control for population density and economic size.  Specifically Rail km per 
                                                 
18 While the quality of the road network might be more relevant than the rail network, we do not have data on road 
coverage for a large number of countries.  However, for the countries, for which we have data on both road and rail 
coverage, the correlation between the two measures is 92%, significant at the 1% level.   19 
 
100 km
2  enters positively and significantly in the branch and ATM penetration and deposit 
indicator regressions, but not in the two loan indicator regressions.  Telephone Mainlines per 
Capita enters significantly in all regressions except for the loan-income ratio regression. 
While these correlations and regressions are suggestive of economic relationships 
between banking system outreach and other country characteristics, they have to be interpreted 
with caution.  In the absence of a more structural model, we are silent on whether our results 
reflect the effects of demand or supply factors and on the causality chain between banking 
system outreach and other country characteristics. 
 
6.  Banking Sector Outreach and Financing Obstacles of Firms 
This section shows that the outreach indicators introduced in this paper are significantly 
associated with cross-country variations in firm-level survey indicators of financing obstacles.  
Specifically we show that: (i) our indicators of outreach capture important dimensions of 
financial sector development beyond financial depth; and (ii) banking system outreach is 
associated with lower levels of financing obstacles for firms.  Given the literature that establishes 
the importance of relaxing financing obstacles for firm growth,
19 these results also suggest that 
broader financial sector outreach matters for economic development.  Below we introduce the 
firm-level survey data and the methodology before discussing our empirical findings. 
 
6.1.  Firm Survey Data 
To assess the relationship between the outreach indicators and firms’ financing obstacles, 
we use data from the World Business Environment Survey (WBES), a unique database of firm-
                                                 
19 See for example Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005).   20 
 
level surveys conducted in 1999 and 2000 for over 10,000 firms in 81 countries.
20  This database 
has several advantages over other firm-level databases.  First, the survey includes a broad variety 
of firms of different ownership structures, sectors, legal forms, and – most importantly – 
different sizes; 80% of the surveyed firms are small or medium-sized, with fewer than 500 
employees.  Second, firm managers were asked about the obstacles they face in their operation 
and growth, including several questions related to the financial system. 
Managers of the surveyed firms were asked to rate how problematic general financing 
obstacles are for the operation and growth of their firm.  Responses varied between a rating of 
one (no obstacle), two (minor obstacle), three (moderate obstacle) and four (major obstacle).  
36% of all firms rate financing as a major obstacle, 27% as moderate, 18% as minor and 19% as 
no obstacle.  In addition to growth obstacles and firm size, the survey also provides general 
information on firms such as size, sector and ownership. 
Self-reported financing obstacles might be subject to biases if slow-growing firms or 
firms with low efficiency and productivity report higher obstacles.  Using the WBES database, 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005) show that firms reporting higher financing 
obstacles indeed grow more slowly, but that this relationship is not due to reverse causation.  
Further, as reported in Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2004), firm-reported financing 
obstacles are negatively and significantly correlated with the efficiency of investment, as 
measured by Wurgler (2000).
21 
While our outreach indicators are available for up to 99 countries and the WBES dataset 
covers 81 countries, there is no perfect overlap, so that our outreach indicator regression sample 
contains data for at most 7,000 firms in 71 countries. 
                                                 
20 For a detailed discussion of the survey see Batra, Kaufmann, and Stone (2002).   
21 This is an investment elasticity that gauges the extent to which a country increases investment in growing 
industries and decreases investment in declining ones.   21 
 
 
6.2.  Methodology 
To assess the relationship between outreach across countries’ and firms’ financing 
obstacles at the country and firm level, we use two different econometric methods.  First, for 
each country, we average firms’ responses regarding the magnitude of general financing 
obstacles they face and we conduct simple OLS regressions of the following form: 
Fi=β0 + β1 Outreachi + β2 Private Credit/GDPi + β3 X i + εI                                   (3) 
where F is the cross-country average of firm’s rating of financing obstacles, Outreach is a vector 
of two of the eight indicators, i is the country index and X is a set of firm-level control variables, 
averaged at the country level.  Specifically, we control for the sample share of small and 
medium-sized firms, government-owned firms, foreign-owned firms, exporters, manufacturing 
firms and service sector firms.  Since geographic and demographic penetration of bank outlets 
are complementary measures, we include the two branch or the two ATM indicators in the same 
regressions.
22  Similarly, we include the two indicators of use of lending services or the two 
indicators of deposit services together.  We control for financial development to assess the 
independent association of banking system outreach with firms’ financing obstacles. 
Cross-country regressions have the advantage that we relate our cross-country indicators 
of banking system outreach to country averages of firm-level data, thus avoiding artificial 
multiplication of degrees of freedom.  The disadvantage is that averaging does not take into 
account the polychotomous and censored character of financing obstacles.  Also, we might lose 
                                                 
22 As noted above, in previous versions we used principal component indicators, combining two outreach indicators 
into one.  Using principal component indicators confirms the importance of branch and ATM penetration and of the 
use of loans for lowering firms’ financing obstacles.  However, this results in a loss of information.  We include both 
indicators to assess whether both dimensions are important or one is more important than the other.   22 
 
important firm-level information by averaging at the country level and cannot investigate the 
differential effect of our indicators on firms of different sizes. 
Second, to mitigate some of the problems with cross-country regressions and to exploit 
firm-level variation in financing obstacles, we conduct the following regressions using firm-level 
data: 
Fi,k =β0 + β1 Outreachi + β2 Private Credit/GDPi + β3 X i,k + εi,k               (4) 
where Fi,k is the rating of financing obstacles reported by firm k in country i and X is a set of 
firm-level control variables.  These include dummy variables for government-owned and 
foreign-owned firms, exporters, firms in manufacturing and services (with firms in other sectors 
captured in the constant) and small or medium-sized firms (with large firms being the omitted 
category).   
Given that financing obstacle is a polychotomous dependent variable with a natural order 
(where higher values indicate larger financing constraints), we use the ordered probit model to 
estimate regression (4).  We assume that the disturbance parameter ε has normal distribution and 
use standard maximum likelihood estimation.  Since omitted country characteristics might cause 
error terms to be correlated for firms within countries, we allow for clustered error terms. 
 
6.3.  Results 
The cross-country results in Table X suggest that firms in countries with higher branch 
and ATM penetration report facing lower financing obstacles.  These indicators enter 
significantly even after controlling for Private Credit/GDP, a standard indicator of financial 
intermediary development.  These findings suggest that a higher penetration of physical bank 
outlets both relative to geographic area and relative to the population helps reduce firms´   23 
 
financing obstacles.  Loans per capita enters negatively and significantly at the 10% level in 
regression (6), but loses significance once we control for financial development.  The loan-
income ratio enters positively and significantly when we control for Private Credit/GDP.   
Deposits per capita does not enter significantly in either regression, while the deposit-income 
ratio only enters significantly when we control for financial development.   
  The economic effect of outreach on firms’ financing obstacles varies across the different 
indicators.  A one standard deviation change in outreach indicators is associated with 0.07, 0.11, 
0.05 and 0.16 lower financing obstacles in the case of geographic branch penetration, 
demographic branch penetration, geographic ATM penetration, and demographic ATM 
penetration, respectively.
23  This compares to a standard deviation of 0.44 in general financing 
obstacles across countries.  Thus, cross-country results suggest that demographic penetration of 
bank outlets is somewhat more important than geographic penetration. 
  The results in Table X also suggest that financial intermediary development is not 
robustly associated with firms’ financing obstacles, once we control for our outreach indicators.  
While Private Credit/GDP enters significantly and negatively by itself (column 1) and when 
controlling for indicators of deposit and loan use, it loses significance once we control for branch 
and ATM penetration indicators.  The R
2 statistics suggest that while financial intermediary 
development and controls for firm characteristics explain 40% of cross-country variation in 
firms’ financing obstacles, and banking system outreach alone explains 28-50% of variation, 
together the independent variables explain 49-79% of cross-country variation.
24 
                                                 
23 We multiply one standard deviation of the respective outreach indicator (Table III) by the Table X coefficient in 
the regression including Private Credit/GDP.  The effect size is larger if we instead use the coefficients from the 
regressions excluding Private Credit/GDP. 
24 We also experimented with regressions where we include GDP per capita instead of Private Credit/GDP.  While it 
does not enter significantly by itself, the demographic penetration ratios also turn insignificant, as does loans per 
capita.  This result can be explained by the high correlation between GDP per capita and demographic branch and   24 
 
Firm-level results shown in Table XI largely confirm the cross-country level findings 
discussed above.  Firms in countries with higher penetration of physical bank outlets report 
facing lower financing obstacles, while there is no significant association between the use of 
deposit services and financing obstacles.  Firms in countries with higher loans per capita also 
report facing lower financing obstacles, while the loan-income ratio does not enter significantly.  
These estimations include controls for firm size, ownership and sector of operation.  Also, to 
lessen the problem of repeating observations for the cross-country variables (in particular the 
access and use indicators), these estimations are conducted allowing for clustered standard errors 
at the country level. 
The firm-level regressions confirm the economically significant effect of increasing 
outreach on lowering firms’ financing obstacles.  An increase in the number of branches (ATMs) 
from the 25
th percentile to the 75
th percentile decreases the probability that firms rate financing 
constraints as a major obstacle by over three (eight) percentage points in the case of branches 
(ATMs) per population and less than one (half) percentage point in case of branches (ATMs) per 
area.  A similar change in the ratio of loans per population decreases the likelihood that finance 
is rated as a major obstacle by over 8 percentage points.  These marginal effects compare to 36% 
of firms in our sample rating financing as a major obstacle. 
In unreported regressions, we also test whether the relationship between our outreach 
indicators and firms’ financing obstacles varies across (i) banking systems with different shares 
of government-owned banks, and (ii) firms of different sizes.
25  We find that neither the share of 
government-owned banks nor firm size has a robust impact on the relationship between higher 
banking sector outreach and lower financing obstacles as reported by firms. 
                                                                                                                                                             
ATM penetration (68% and 78% respectively).  Given the high correlation between Private Credit/GDP and GDP 
per capita (72%), we refrain from including both in the same regression. 
25 These results are available upon request.   25 
 
To assess the robustness of our results, we conducted additional sensitivity analyses not 
reported here.
26 First, we controlled for a potential non-linear relationship between outreach 
indicators and firms’ financing obstacles and patterns by including a squared term.  This term did 
not enter significantly. 
Second, as the WBES provides survey responses to more detailed questions on financing 
obstacles, we also estimated the regressions using survey responses on: (i) the extent to which 
firms report needing  special connections to access finance; and (ii) the degree to which access to 
long-term loans are obstacles to firms’ operation and growth.  Our main finding that higher 
penetration of physical bank outlets and more extensive use of loans are associated with lower 
financing obstacles is confirmed in those estimations. 
 
7.  Conclusions  
This paper introduces a new set of financial sector outreach indicators – indicators of the 
access to and use of deposit and lending services.  While admittedly crude, they are the first such 
indicators for a broad cross-section of developed and developing countries.  They are an 
important complement to indicators of the depth and efficiency of financial systems commonly 
used in the finance literature. 
We also show the predictive power of our aggregate measures by relating them to user-
based household and firm surveys.  In particular, we show that our indicators of deposit and loan 
use predict the share of households with bank accounts and the share of small firms with bank 
loans.  While preliminary results are based on a limited number of observations, they underline 
the usefulness of aggregate indicators, especially in the absence of consistent household and firm 
surveys for a large cross-section of countries. 
                                                 
26 These results are available upon request.   26 
 
There is a large variation in outreach across countries.  We show that the new outreach 
indicators are significantly correlated with economic development and with traditional indicators 
of financial depth, such as private credit, liquid liabilities, and bank deposits to GDP. 
In terms of what explains outreach, we find that geographic access to banking services is 
positively correlated with population density and access to and use of banking services are higher 
in larger economies, suggesting scale economies in banking service delivery.  In addition, our 
regression analysis suggests that other country characteristics as well as policy variables are also 
correlated with higher outreach.  Specifically, we find that a better communication and 
transportation infrastructure is associated with greater outreach.  Countries with better developed 
institutions enjoy greater levels of outreach.  Effective credit information sharing systems are 
positively associated with measures of access to bank outlets, while restrictions on banks’ 
activities and entry bank requirements are negatively – albeit less robustly – correlated with 
outreach. 
Finally, we link the new outreach indicators to firms’ financing obstacles to assess the 
potential economic relevance of banking system outreach.  Both cross-country and firm-level 
regressions indicate that firms in countries with higher branch and ATM penetration and more 
extensive use of loans report lower financing obstacles.  The degree of government ownership in 
banking does not significantly affect the impact of outreach on firms’ financing obstacles, and 
the effect of outreach does not systematically vary across firms of different sizes.   
The indicators introduced in this paper should be seen as a first attempt at developing 
consistent and comparable cross-country indicators of banking system outreach.  With these 
indicators we hope to inform the debate on access to banking services, its effects and its 
determinants.  These indicators and their empirical relationship with desirable outcomes at the   27 
 
firm, household, and country level will give us insights into the importance of access to financial 
services for pro-poor economic development.  While cross-country evidence suggests a positive 
relationship between financial intermediary development and poverty alleviation, indicators of 
financial outreach together with firm and household data will help us disentangle the channels 
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TABLE I 
Branch and ATM Penetration Across Countries 
 
Geographic branch (ATM) penetration refers to the number of branches (ATMs) per 1,000 square kilometers. Demographic branch 
(ATM) penetration refers to the number of branches (ATMs) per 100,000 people. Reported indicators are based on data collected via a 
regulatory survey. The questions asked were as follows: number of Branches – “How many bank branches do deposit money banks have 
(combined for all banks) in your country?”  Number of ATMs – “How many ATMs (automated cash withdrawal machines) are there in 
your country”  Data sources are in Appendix A.1. and A.3. Country ordering for each indicator is included in parentheses; higher 
numbers reflect lower values of the indicators. 
 








GDP per capita 
 
Albania  2.45 (63)  2.11 (85)  2.74 (62)  2.37 (76)  1,933 
Argentina  1.40 (76)  10.01 (39)  2.09 (65)  14.91 (50)  3,381 
Armenia  8.23 (43)  7.59 (55)  1.49 (68)  1.37 (78)  915 
Australia  .77 (83)  29.86 (15)  1.66 (66)  64.18 (14)  26,062 
Austria  52.47 (14)  53.87 (2)  84.95 (15)  87.21 (7)  31,202 
Azerbaijan  3.90 (54)  4.11 (71)  .  .  865 
Bahrain  135.21 (5)  13.48 (31)  269.01 (5)  26.83 (31)  10,791 
Bangladesh  47.46 (17)  4.47 (67)  .61 (77)  .06 (89)  376 
Belarus  2.28 (67)  4.79 (64)  2.41 (63)  5.06 (67)  1,770 
Belgium  181.65 (3)  53.15 (3)  229.28 (6)  67.09 (12)  29,205 
Belize  1.67 (73)  14.67 (27)  .  .  3,583 
Bolivia  .13 (95)  1.53 (90)  .40 (81)  4.80 (69)  894 
Bosnia  3.15 (59)  3.86 (72)  4.38 (58)  5.36 (65)  1,682 
Botswana  .11 (97)  3.77 (73)  .27 (84)  9.00 (59)  4,290 
Brazil  3.05 (60)  14.59 (28)  3.72 (60)  17.82 (40)  2,788 
Bulgaria  9.81 (39)  13.87 (29)  21.09 (34)  29.79 (26)  2,538 
Canada  1.56 (74)  45.60 (7)  4.64 (57)  135.23 (1)  26,380 
Chile  1.98 (70)  9.39 (43)  5.06 (55)  24.03 (32)  4,591 
China  1.83 (71)  1.33 (93)  5.25 (54)  3.80 (70)  1,094 
Colombia  3.74 (55)  8.74 (47)  4.10 (59)  9.60 (57)  1,747 
Costa Rica  7.52 (45)  9.59 (42)  10.07 (45)  12.83 (52)  4,365 
Croatia  18.62 (27)  23.36 (19)  31.96 (27)  40.10 (23)  6,356 
Czech Republic  14.73 (29)  11.15 (35)  25.84 (31)  19.57 (37)  8,375 
Denmark  47.77 (16)  37.63 (10)  66.51 (18)  52.39 (17)  39,429 
Dominican Republic  10.83 (36)  6.00 (60)  27.24 (29)  15.08 (49)  1,821 
Ecuador  4.38 (51)  9.30 (44)  2.97 (61)  6.32 (62)  2,066 
Egypt  2.45 (63)  3.62 (74)  1.21 (70)  1.78 (77)  1,220 
El Salvador  14.58 (30)  4.62 (66)  34.89 (24)  11.07 (56)  2,204 
Estonia  4.85 (49)  15.19 (25)  18.43 (36)  57.7 (16)  6,210 
Ethiopia  .28 (88)  .41 (98)  .  .  97 
Fiji  2.52 (62)  5.51 (62)  5.69 (52)  12.46 (54)  2,696 
Finland  3.26 (58)  19.06 (22)  13.55 (41)  79.21 (8)  31,007 
France  46.94 (18)  43.23 (8)  76.33 (16)  70.30 (10)  29,267 
Georgia  2.32 (66)  3.14 (78)  .86 (75)  1.17 (80)  768 
Germany  116.90 (6)  49.41 (6)  144.68 (8)  61.16 (15)  29,081 
Ghana  1.43 (75)  1.60 (89)  .  .  375 
Greece  25.53 (22)  30.81 (13)  39.39 (22)  47.55 (20)  16,203 
Guatemala  11.49 (33)  10.12 (37)  22.93 (32)  20.20 (35)  2,009 
Guyana  .12 (96)  3.12 (79)  .25 (85)  6.50 (61)  965 
Honduras  .46 (87)  .73 (94)  2.22 (64)  3.56 (72)  1,001 
Hungary  31.04 (21)  28.25 (16)  32.30 (25)  29.40 (28)  8,182 
India  22.57 (24)  6.30 (59)  .  .  563 
Indonesia  10.00 (38)  8.44 (49)  5.73 (51)  4.84 (68)  971 
Iran  3.40 (57)  8.39 (50)  .51 (80)  1.25 (79)  2,061 
Ireland  13.41 (31)  23.41 (18)  27.78 (28)  48.49 (19)  37,637 
Israel  47.82 (15)  14.74 (26)  61.01 (20)  18.81 (38)  16,686 
Italy  102.05 (7)  52.07 (4)  131.71 (10)  67.20 (11)  25,429 
Japan  34.82 (20)  9.98 (40)  396.98 (4)  113.75 (4)  34,010 
Jordan  5.98 (47)  10.02 (38)  5.60 (53)  9.38 (58)  1,858 
Kazakhstan  .14 (94)  2.47 (82)  .39 (82)  7.01 (60)  1,995 
Kenya  .77 (83)  1.38 (92)  .56 (78)  .99 (81)  434 
Korea  65.02 (12)  13.40 (32)  436.88 (3)  90.03 (6)  12,634   32
TABLE I (Continued) 
Branch and ATM Penetration Across Countries 
 
Geographic branch (ATM) penetration refers to the number of branches (ATMs) per 1,000 square kilometers. Demographic branch 
(ATM) penetration refers to the number of branches (ATMs) per 100,000 people. Reported indicators are based on data collected via a 
regulatory survey. The questions asked were as follows: Number of Branches – “How many bank branches do deposit money banks 
have (combined for all banks) in your country?”  Number of ATMs – “How many ATMs (automated cash withdrawal machines) are 
there in your country?”  Data sources are in Appendix Tables A.1 and A.3. Country ordering for each indicator is included in 
parentheses; higher numbers reflect lower values of the indicators. 
 








GDP per capita 
 
Kuwait  11.05 (35)  8.27 (51)  26.32 (30)  19.69 (36)  14,848 
Kyrgizstan  .82 (82)  3.11 (80)  .  .  344 
Lebanon  79.18 (8)  18.01 (24)  73.90 (17)  16.81 (44)  4,224 
Lithuania  1.81 (72)  3.39 (75)  15.34 (39)  28.78 (30)  5,273 
Madagascar  .19 (92)  .66 (95)  .07 (88)  .22 (86)  323 
Malaysia  7.39 (46)  9.80 (41)  12.40 (42)  16.44 (47)  4,164 
Malta  375.00 (2)  30.08 (14)  462.50 (2)  37.09 (25)  9,699 
Mauritius  71.92 (10)  11.92 (34)  133.00 (9)  22.04 (33)  4,265 
Mexico  4.09 (53)  7.63 (54)  8.91 (46)  16.63 (45)  6,121 
Namibia  .11 (97)  4.47 (67)  .30 (83)  12.11 (55)  2,312 
Nepal  2.96 (61)  1.72 (86)  .15 (86)  .09 (88)  237 
Netherlands  163.81 (4)  34.23 (11)  223.02 (7)  46.60 (21)  31,548 
New Zealand  4.19 (52)  28.04 (17)  7.53 (47)  50.36 (18)  19,021 
Nicaragua  1.29 (77)  2.85 (81)  1.18 (71)  2.61 (75)  748 
Nigeria  2.41 (65)  1.62 (88)  .  .  370 
Norway  3.41 (56)  22.92 (20)  .  .  48,592 
Pakistan  9.10 (41)  4.73 (65)  1.02 (73)  .53 (85)  464 
Panama  5.16 (48)  12.87 (33)  6.49 (48)  16.19 (48)  4,328 
Papua New Guinea  .20 (91)  1.64 (87)  .  .  617 
Peru  .89 (81)  4.17 (70)  1.24 (69)  5.85 (64)  2,247 
Philippines  21.40 (25)  7.83 (53)  14.52 (40)  5.31 (66)  989 
Poland  10.25 (37)  8.17 (52)  21.72 (33)  17.31 (42)  5,487 
Portugal  57.45 (13)  51.58 (5)  121.50 (12)  109.09 (5)  14,665 
Romania  13.26 (32)  13.76 (30)  12.02 (43)  12.47 (53)  2,719 
Russia  .19 (92)  2.24 (83)  .53 (79)  6.28 (63)  3,022 
Saudi Arabia  .56 (86)  5.36 (63)  1.54 (67)  14.70 (51)  8,366 
Singapore  636.07 (1)  9.13 (46)  2,642.62 (1)  37.93 (24)  21,492 
Slovakia  11.33 (34)  10.28 (36)  32.21 (26)  29.21 (29)  5,922 
Slovenia  2.14 (69)  2.19 (84)  64.56 (19)  66.14 (13)  13,383 
South Africa  2.22 (68)  5.99 (61)  6.49 (48)  17.50 (41)  3,530 
Spain  78.90 (9)  95.87 (1)  104.18 (14)  126.60 (2)  20,343 
Sri Lanka  20.41 (26)  6.87 (57)  10.91 (44)  3.67 (71)  965 
Sweden  4.74 (50)  21.80 (21)  6.43 (50)  29.56 (27)  33,586 
Switzerland  70.54 (11)  37.99 (9)  131.10 (11)  70.60 (9)  42,138 
Tanzania  .23 (89)  .57 (96)  .07 (88)  .17 (87)  275 
Thailand  8.71 (42)  7.18 (56)  20.69 (35)  17.05 (43)  2,309 
Trinidad and Tobago  23.59 (23)  9.22 (45)  52.44 (21)  20.49 (34)  7,769 
Turkey  7.81 (44)  8.50 (48)  16.54 (38)  18.00 (39)  3,365 
Uganda  .67 (85)  .53 (97)  .90 (74)  .70 (83)  245 
Ukraine  .  .  .78 (76)  .93 (82)  1,024 
United Kingdom  45.16 (19)  18.35 (23)  104.46 (13)  42.45 (22)  30,278 
United States  9.81 (39)  30.86 (12)  38.43 (23)  120.94 (3)  37,388 
Uruguay  1.23 (79)  6.39 (58)  .  .  3,308 
Venezuela  1.28 (78)  4.41 (69)  4.81 (56)  16.60 (46)  3,319 
West Bank-Gaza  18.33 (28)  3.27 (76)  18.17 (37)  3.24 (74)  1,026 
Zambia  .21 (90)  1.52 (91)  .09 (87)  .65 (84)  413 
Zimbabwe  1.11 (80)  3.27 (76)  1.15 (72)  3.38 (73)  634   33
TABLE II 
Use of Loan and Deposit Services Across Countries 
 
Loan (deposit) accounts per capita refers to the number of loans (deposits) per 1,000 people. Loan (deposit) – income ratio refers to the 
average size of loans (deposits) per GDP per capita. Reported indicators are based on data collected via a regulatory survey. The 
questions asked were as follows: Number of Loans – “How many loans are there in your country right now that have been issued by 
deposit money banks?  (Please include loans from deposit money banks to individuals, businesses and others, including home 
mortgages, consumer loans, business loans, trade loans, student loans, emergency loans, agricultural loans, etc.)”  Value of Loans – 
“What is the total value of these loans?  (Please specify currency and units.)  Number of Deposits – “How many deposit accounts are 
there at deposit money banks in your country right now?  (Please include all current (checking) accounts, savings accounts and time 
deposits for businesses, individuals and others.)”  Value of Deposits – “What is the total value of these deposits?  (Please specify 
currency and units.)”  Data sources are in Appendix Tables A.1 and A.3. Country ordering for each indicator is included in parentheses; 
higher numbers reflect lower values of the indicators. 
 
Country Loan  accounts  per 
capita 
Loan-income ratio  Deposit accounts per 
capita 
Deposit-income ratio  GDP per capita 
 
Albania  4.42 (43)  15.41 (4)  161.25 (47)  2.75 (9)  1,933 
Argentina  154.19 (16)  1.77 (37)  368.73 (37)  .58 (29)  3,381 
Armenia  41.23 (39)  1.93 (34)  111.38 (49)  1.00 (22)  915 
Austria  647.64 (4)  1.84 (36)  3,119.95 (1)  .26 (45)  31,202 
Bangladesh  54.73 (31)  5.22 (16)  228.75 (43)  1.60 (16)  376 
Belgium  59.47 (29)  21.09 (2)  3,080.31 (2)  .38 (41)  29,205 
Bolivia  9.53 (41)  27.89 (1)  40.63 (53)  5.81 (5)  894 
Bosnia  114.09 (18)  3.19 (24)  429.40 (32)  1.87 (13)  1,682 
Brazil  49.59 (35)  6.18 (13)  630.86 (25)  .40 (39)  2,788 
Bulgaria  73.85 (26)  4.24 (20)  1,351.37 (16)  .26 (45)  2,538 
Chile  417.74 (8)  1.60 (38)  1,044.82 (22)  .46 (34)  4,591 
Colombia  .  .  612.21 (26)  .42 (37)  1,747 
Czech Republic  .  .  1,922.83 (9)  .42 (37)  8,375 
Denmark  450.99 (7)  2.09 (33)  2,706.07 (3)  .22 (49)  39,429 
Dominican Republic  50.10 (34)  6.71 (11)  719.52 (24)  .10 (52)  1,821 
Ecuador  77.09 (25)  2.63 (29)  419.54 (34)  .63 (28)  2,066 
El Salvador  126.89 (17)  .39 (43)  456.69 (30)  .12 (51)  2,204 
Fiji  67.09 (28)  4.75 (18)  444.42 (31)  1.13 (21)  2,696 
France  .  .  1,800.84 (11)  .40 (39)  29,267 
Greece  776.48 (1)  .83 (41)  2,417.64 (5)  .29 (43)  16,203 
Guatemala  45.79 (38)  3.19 (24)  403.54 (35)  .55 (30)  2,009 
Guyana  .  .  571.03 (27)  1.37 (18)  965 
Honduras  67.27 (27)  6.13 (14)  287.27 (41)  .74 (25)  1,001 
Iran  48.19 (36)  2.91 (27)  2,249.28 (6)  .04 (54)  2,061 
Israel  709.90 (3)  1.58 (39)  .  .  16,686 
Italy  328.15 (11)  2.35 (32)  975.64 (23)  .47 (33)  25,429 
Jordan  80.39 (23)  8.20 (9)  465.48 (29)  1.41 (17)  1,858 
Kenya  .  .  69.98 (51)  6.26 (4)  434 
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TABLE II (Continued) 
Use of Loan and Deposit Services Across Countries 
 
Loan (deposit) accounts per capita refers to the number of loans (deposits) per 1,000 people. Loan (deposit) – income ratio refers to the 
average size of loans (deposits) per GDP per capita. Reported indicators are based on data collected via a regulatory survey. The 
questions asked were as follows: Number of Loans – “How many loans are there in your country right now that have been issued by 
deposit money banks?  (Please include loans from deposit money banks to individuals, businesses and others, including home 
mortgages, consumer loans, business loans, trade loans, student loans, emergency loans, agricultural loans, etc.)”  Value of Loans – 
“What is the total value of these loans?  (Please specify currency and units.)  Number of Deposits – “How many deposit accounts are 
there at deposit money banks in your country right now?  (Please include all current (checking) accounts, savings accounts and time 
deposits for businesses, individuals and others.)”  Value of Deposits – “What is the total value of these deposits?  (Please specify 
currency and units.)”  Data sources are in Appendix Tables A.1 and A.3. Country ordering for each indicator is included in parentheses; 
higher numbers reflect lower values of the indicators. 
 
Country Loan  accounts  per 
capita 
Loan-income ratio  Deposit accounts per 
capita 
Deposit-income ratio  GDP per capita 
 
Lebanon  93.42 (20)  9.13 (7)  382.53 (36)  6.65 (3)  4,224 
Lithuania  58.86 (30)  3.65 (23)  1,166.45 (19)  .21 (50)  5,273 
Madagascar  4.38 (44)  18.35 (3)  14.46 (54)  9.31 (1)  323 
Malaysia  328.97 (10)  2.95 (26)  1,250.10 (17)  .92 (23)  4,164 
Malta  407.21 (9)  6.24 (12)  2,495.81 (4)  1.22 (20)  9,699 
Mauritius  207.13 (15)  2.75 (28)  1,585.99 (14)  .53 (31)  4,265 
Mexico  .  .  309.57 (39)  .46 (34)  6,121 
Namibia  80.74 (22)  5.16 (17)  422.96 (33)  1.27 (19)  2,312 
Nicaragua  95.61 (19)  2.49 (30)  96.12 (50)  4.70 (7)  748 
Norway  .  .  1,610.78 (13)  .23 (48)  48,592 
Pakistan  21.93 (40)  14.26 (5)  191.84 (45)  2.63 (10)  464 
Panama  297.84 (12)  5.32 (15)  .  .  4,328 
Papua New Guinea  .  .  119.77 (48)  2.48 (11)  617 
Peru  77.92 (24)  2.45 (31)  316.19 (38)  .74 (25)  2,247 
Philippines  .  .  302.05 (40)  1.77 (14)  989 
Poland  773.87 (2)  .33 (44)  .  .  5,487 
Romania  .  .  1,207.88 (18)  .25 (47)  2,719 
Russia  54.11 (32)  4.23 (21)  1,892.28 (10)  .07 (53)  3,022 
Saudi Arabia  47.45 (37)  7.73 (10) 214.13  (44) 2.28  (12)  8,366 
Singapore  513.23 (6)  3.84 (22)  1,670.88 (12)  1.62 (15)  21,492 
Spain  556.48 (5)  1.91 (35)  2,075.96 (7)  .44 (36)  20,343 
Switzerland  .  .  1,985.84 (8)  .29 (43)  42,138 
Thailand  247.87 (14)  4.56 (19)  1,423.12 (15)  .83 (24)  2,309 
Trinidad and Tobago  .  .  1,073.48 (21)  .35 (42)  7,769 
Turkey  264.51 (13)  .65 (42)  1,114.23 (20)  .68 (27)  3,365 
Uganda  5.79 (42)  10.74 (6)  46.64 (52)  3.93 (8)  245 
Venezuela  93.04 (21)  1.02 (40)  486.74 (28)  .48 (32)  3,319 
West Bank-Gaza  50.15 (33)  8.25 (8)  253.99 (42)  4.91 (6)  1,026 
Zimbabwe  .  .  173.56 (46)  7.98 (2)  634 
   35 
 
TABLE III 
Outreach Indicators: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations  
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 








Loan accounts per 
capita 
Loan-income ratio  Deposit accounts per 
capita 
Deposit-income ratio 
Number  of  Responses  98 98 89 89 44 44 54 54 
Mean  29.89 13.80 74.94 28.11  198.53 5.64 943.94 1.61 
Standard deviation  79.41  15.98  289.57  32.21  222.83 5.79 858.27 2.14 
Minimum  .11 .41 .07 .06 4.38 .33  14.46  .04 
5
th percentile  .18  1.24  .26  .58 6.35 .68  61.81  .11 
Median 4.80  8.42  10.07  16.63 80.57  3.75 528.89  .66 
95
th percentile  119.65  49.74  253.12 101.46 700.56  17.91 2,569.40 6.40 
Maximum 636.07  95.87  2,642.62  135.23 776.48  27.89 3,119.95 9.31 
 
Panel B: Correlation Among Outreach Indicators and with Economic Development 
 








Loan accounts per 
capita 




penetration  .292***         
Geographic ATM 
penetration  .896***  .084        
Demographic ATM 
penetration  .216**  .784***  .186*       
Loans per capita  .326**  .506*** .273*  .583***        
Loan-income ratio  .017  -.103 -.034 -.171 -.446***       
Deposits per capita  .391*** .678*** .235*  .717*** .682*** -.196     
Deposit-income ratio  -.059 -.304**  -.033 -.360***  -.320**  .618***  -.500***   
GDP per Capita  .284*** .684*** .234**  .780*** .605*** -.103  .685*** -.311** 
 
   36 
 
Table IV 
Predicting Use of Financial Services with Outreach Indicators 
 
Column (1) presents the share of households with bank accounts, using data from Claessens (2005) and Gasparini et al. (2005).  Column (2) 
presents the predicted share of households with bank accounts calculated using the coefficients from the regression of column 1 on the log of 
deposit accounts per 100,000 and the log of average deposit account size in US dollars. Column (3) presents the share of surveyed small firms 
(firms with 5 to 50 employees) with bank loans, using data from WBES, and column (4) the predicted value of the share of small firms with 
bank loans based on the log of loan accounts per 100,000 and the log of average loan account size in US dollars. 
 








































Albania   .335  .038  .200 Lebanon    .786    .456 
Argentina  .280  .536  .415  Lithuania  .353  .198  .387 
Armenia  .089 .025 .000  .254  Madagascar   .001   .131 
Austria  .814 .879   .634  Malaysia   .600  .520  .510 
Bangladesh    .037  .111 .281 Malta    .905    .598 
Belgium  .927 .922   .542  Mauritius    .537    .469 
Bolivia    .121  .500 .251 Mexico  .250  .319    
Bosnia   .392    .385  Namibia  .284  .377    .392 
Brazil  .427 .259 .280  .368  Nicaragua  .047  .177  .357  .324 
Bulgaria  .002 .277 .156  .380  Norway    .837    
Chile    .459  .690 .507 Pakistan  .122  .101  .222  .260 
Colombia  .412 .178     Panama    .538  .529 
Czech Republic    .651      Papua New Guinea    .078    
Denmark  .991 .871   .620  Peru    .224  .600  .355 
Dominican  Republic    .022  .619 .354 Philippines    .226    
Ecuador  .161 .222 .412  .353  Poland    .280  .495 
El  Salvador    .020  .469 .313 Romania    .265    
Fiji   .391    .380  Russia    .134  .195  .362 
France  .963 .863     Saudi  Arabia    .621    .423 
Greece  .789 .746   .585  Singapore    .977  .600  .631 
Guatemala  .178 .187 .524  .318  Spain  .916  .837  .565  .604 
Guyana  .137 .274     Switzerland    .879    
Honduras    .079  .441 .347 Thailand    .491    .479 
Iran    .039    .319  Trinidad and Tobago    .508    
Israel      .607  Turkey    .485  .456  .415 
Italy  .704 .775 .545  .580  Uganda    .003    .129 
Jordan   .370    .402  Venezuela    .283  .323  .348 
Kenya  .100 .094     West  Bank-Gaza    .397    .338 
        Z i m b a b w e     .337    
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TABLE V 
Correlation of Outreach Indicators with Other Country Characteristics 
 
Pairwise correlation coefficients between Table I and II outreach indicators and country characteristics. Summary statistics are in Appendix Table A.2 and definitions and data sources are 























GDP per capita 
Population Density  .882***  .000  .969***  .043 .230 -.037  .156 .005 .121 
Ln  (GDP)  .119 .533***  .108 .619*** .459*** -.258*  .508*** -.441***  .635*** 
Telephone Mainlines per  Population  .338*** .717*** .251**  .800*** .746*** -.265* .820***  -.449***  .894*** 
Rail Km per Sq Km  .681***  .517***  .597*** .489*** .389**  .022  .640*** -.328*  .549*** 
Governance  Index  .350*** .655*** .284*** .747*** .685*** -.166  .751*** -.428***  .815*** 
Barriers to Economic Freedom  -.315***  -.552*** -.276*** -.628*** -.511*** .027 -.414***  .277**  -.694*** 
Cost to Enforce Contract (Percent of Debt)  -.147 -.295***  -.134 -.362***  -.345**  .075 -.452***  .207 -.344*** 
Credit Information Index  .162  .430*** .096  .449*** .286*  -.245 .227  -.355**  .477*** 
Restrictions of Banks’ Activities  -.068 -.412***  -.005 -.340***  -.165 .108 -.338**  .198 -.414*** 
Entry into Banking Requirements  .096  .034 .079 -.007  -.333**  .179 -.042  .108 -.189* 
Share of Assets in Government-Owned Banks  -.136 -.182 -.104 -.211*  .037 .010 -.115  -.129  -.225** 
Share of Assets in Foreign-Owned Banks  -.075 -.197*  -.106 -.213*  -.247 .161  -.203 .104  -.299*** 
Concentration .207**  .098  .184*  .042 .137 .053 .306**  -.092  .076 
Private Credit / GDP  .373***  .576***  .298*** .642*** .572*** -.035  .637*** -.225  .719*** 
Liquid Liabilities / GDP  .400***  .353*** .339*** .425*** .494*** .010 .542***  -.099  .468*** 
Total Deposits / GDP  .548***  .540***  .339*** .349*** .383**  .068  .494*** .035  .501*** 
Overhead Costs / Total Assets  -.294*** -.274*** -.239**  -.313*** -.316**  -.220 -.377***  -.001 -.400*** 
Net Interest Margin   -.286***  -.399*** -.218**  -.444*** -.431*** -.101 -.493***  .255* -.512*** 
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TABLE VI 
What Explains Outreach? Institutional Quality Indicators 
 
OLS estimation with robust standard errors performed: Indicator = β0 + β1(Determinant) + β2(Ln GDP in US$) + β3(Population in Thousands per Square Kilometer). Definitions and 
data sources are in Appendix A.3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 10% level  ** Significant at 5% level  *** Significant at 1% level 
 








Loan accounts per 
capita 




.018 .095 .029 .216 .168 -.671  .672 -.832  Governance Index 
(.007)*** (.013)*** (.011)*** (.026)*** (.033)*** (1.176)  (.136)*** (.304)*** 
.000 .022 .009 .054 .034 -.755  .109 -.353  Ln (GDP in US$) 
(.003) (.007)***  (.005)*  (.013)***  (.012)*** (.452)  (.055)*  (.135)** 
.093 -.022  .366 -.027  .007  -.008 -.025 .226  Population (in 1000) per Sq Km 
(.008)*** (.009)**  (.012)*** (.012)**  (.011) (.291) (.047) (.085)** 
N  98 98 89 89 44 44 54 54 
R-Squared  .82 .50 .96 .65 .53 .07 .61 .28 
 








Loan accounts per 
capita 




-.016 -.100 -.025 -.219 -.144 -.409 -.377 .640  Barriers to Economic Freedom 
(.004)*** (.016)*** (.015)  (.032)*** (.035)***  (1.389) (.220)* (.461) 
.001 .029 .011 .071 .046 -.870  .191 -.420  Ln (GDP in US$) 
(.002) (.008)***  (.004)**  (.014)***  (.016)*** (.537)  (.064)*** (.145)*** 
.094 -.020  .368 -.022  .021 -.236  .062 .134  Population (in 1000) per Sq Km 
(.009)*** (.010)**  (.011)*** (.013)  (.013)*  (.338) (.073) (.097) 
N  96 96 88 88 43 43 52 52 
R-Squared  .80 .43 .96 .56 .39 .06 .33 .20 
 
 








Loan accounts per 
capita 




.000  -.001 -.001 -.005 -.003 -.033 -.011 .001  Cost to Enforce Contract (Percent of Debt) 
(.000)  (.001)** (.000)** (.001)***  (.003) (.125) (.007) (.014) 
.006 .045 .013 .103 .059 -1.033  .257 -.611  Ln (GDP in US$) 
(.002)*** (.009)*** (.004)*** (.017)*** (.017)*** (.737)  (.056)*** (.194)*** 
.090 -.013  .372 -.001  .035 -.140  .060 .072  Population (in 1000) per Sq Km 
(.002)*** (.004)*** (.010)*** (.010)  (.009)*** (.258)  (.027)**  (.058) 
N  91 91 83 83 41 41 49 49 
R-Squared  .88 .35 .95 .45 .30 .08 .44 .24 
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TABLE VII 
What Explains Outreach? Credit Information Sharing and Banking Freedom 
 
OLS estimation with robust standard errors performed: Indicator = β0 + β1(Determinant) + β2(Ln GDP in US$) + β3(Population in Thousands per Square Kilometer). Definitions and 
data sources are in Appendix A.3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 10% level  ** Significant at 5% level  *** Significant at 1% level 
 








Loan accounts per 
capita 




.003 .018 .006 .040 .026 -.673  .009 -.251  Credit Information Index 
(.001)** (.007)** (.003)** (.015)***  (.015) (.436) (.050) (.159) 
.005 .041 .012 .096 .061 -.953  .301 -.574  Ln (GDP in US$) 
(.001)*** (.009)*** (.004)*** (.017)*** (.018)*** (.578)  (.056)*** (.178)*** 
.091 -.011  .373 .004 .039 -.141  .077 .062  Population (in 1000) per Sq Km 
(.001)*** (.004)*** (.010)*** (.010)  (.007)*** (.148)  (.026)*** (.051) 
N  90 90 82 82 40 40 48 48 
R-Squared  .88 .37 .95 .44 .31 .13 .38 .30 
 








Loan accounts per 
capita 




-.002 -.017 .002  -.015 .004  -.001 -.051 -.027  Restrictions of Banks’ Activities 
(.001)** (.006)***  (.003)  (.013)  (.017) (.446) (.046) (.120) 
.002 .037 .017 .103 .061 -.843  .185 -.521  Ln (GDP in US$) 
(.003)  (.008)*** (.005)*** (.019)*** (.020)*** (.586)  (.073)**  (.196)** 
.098 -.002  .379 .019 .047 -.179  .149 .006  Population (in 1000) per Sq Km 
(.010)*** (.012)  (.002)*** (.018)  (.013)*** (.192)  (.081)*  (.090) 
N  84 84 77 77 38 38 47 47 
R-Squared  .80 .34 .98 .43 .25 .06 .26 .18 
 








Loan accounts per 
capita 




.003 .010 .004 .006 -.066 .912  -.039 .209  Entry into Banking Requirements 
(.002)*  (.009) (.003) (.014) (.023)*** (.506)*  (.067)  (.173) 
.004 .045 .015 .109 .053 -.699  .218 -.462  Ln (GDP in US$) 
(.003)  (.009)*** (.004)*** (.017)*** (.018)*** (.560)  (.060)*** (.145)*** 
.098 -.004  .378 .017 .053 -.246  .152 -.002  Population (in 1000) per Sq Km 
(.010)*** (.011)  (.002)*** (.018)  (.013)*** (.198)  (.083)*  (.084) 
N  86 86 78 78 39 39 49 49 
R-Squared  .80 .30 .97 .41 .35 .08 .27 .18 
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TABLE VIII 
What Explains Outreach? Banking System Structure 
 
OLS estimation with robust standard errors performed: Indicator = β0 + β1(Determinant) + β2(Ln GDP in US$) + β3(Population in Thousands per Square Kilometer). Definitions and 
data sources are in Appendix A.3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 10% level  ** Significant at 5% level  *** Significant at 1% level 
 








Loan accounts per 
capita 




-.029 -.184 -.022 -.459 -.098 3.395 -1.069  -.840  Share of Assets in Government-Owned Banks 
(.015)*  (.066)*** (.035)  (.141)*** (.248) (7.499)  (.691) (1.479) 
.003 .043 .015 .110 .061 -.957  .225 -.438  Ln (GDP in US$) 
(.003)  (.010)*** (.004)*** (.017)*** (.018)*** (.639)  (.072)*** (.154)*** 
.097 -.007  .378 .008 .045 -.109  .123 .007  Population (in 1000) per Sq Km 
(.010)*** (.011)  (.002)*** (.018)  (.014)***  (.273) (.079) (.097) 
N  81 81 74 74 38 38 46 46 
R-Squared  .80 .31 .98 .46 .26 .07 .26 .15 
 








Loan accounts per 
capita 




.004 .012 .016 .060 .142 -2.960  .008 -.494  Share of Assets in Foreign-Owned Banks 
(.008) (.042) (.016) (.101) (.170) (3.883)  (.445) (1.118) 
.003 .040 .016 .111 .083 -1.569  .198 -.501  Ln (GDP in US$) 
(.002)  (.009)*** (.005)*** (.019)*** (.028)*** (.836)*  (.066)*** (.202)** 
.218 .117 .379 .237 .382 -4.195  1.617  -1.131  Population (in 1000) per Sq Km 
(.048)*** (.061)*  (.043)*** (.086)*** (.085)*** (3.939)  (.308)*** (1.307) 
N  76 76 70 70 35 35 43 43 
R-Squared  .75 .27 .74 .41 .34 .15 .35 .15 
 








Loan accounts per 
capita 




.058 .319 .053 .481 .237 .227 2.261  -2.938  Concentration  
(.021)*** (.091)*** (.038)  (.176)*** (.184) (4.969)  (.516)***  (1.380)** 
.006 .054 .016 .117 .064 -.915  .303 -.599  Ln (GDP in US$) 
(.002)**  (.010)*** (.004)*** (.018)*** (.019)*** (.646)  (.054)*** (.153)*** 
.095 -.016  .370 -.004  .034 -.193  .032 .142  Population (in 1000) per Sq Km 
(.009)*** (.011)  (.011)*** (.017)  (.013)**  (.260) (.065) (.093) 
N  96 96 87 87 42 42 52 52 
R-Squared  .80 .39 .95 .44 .28 .07 .47 .25   41 
 
TABLE IX 
What Explains Outreach? Physical Infrastructure 
 
OLS estimation with robust standard errors performed: Indicator = β0 + β1(Determinant) + β2(Ln GDP in US$) + β3(Population in Thousands per Square Kilometer). Definitions and 
data sources are in Appendix A.3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 10% level  ** Significant at 5% level  *** Significant at 1% level 
 








Loan accounts per 
capita 




.006 .024 .009 .037 .026 .446 .164 -.110  Rail Km per 100 Sq Km Area 
(.002)*** (.008)*** (.003)*** (.013)*** (.027) (.748) (.039)***  (.048)** 
.005 .039 .016 .077 .059 -1.863  .218 -.634  Ln (GDP in US$) 
(.002)** (.014)***  (.006)** (.023)***  (.019)*** (.891)**  (.062)*** (.233)** 
.072 -.125  .088 -.200  -.109 .161  -.772 .199  Population (in 1000) per Sq Km 
(.033)**  (.073)* (.095)  (.116)* (.115) (2.995)  (.210)***  (.634) 
N  62 62 58 58 29 29 35 35 
R-Squared  .60 .40 .53 .40 .30 .18 .58 .36 
 








Loan accounts per 
capita 




.103 .480 .141 1.064  .800 -6.389  3.347  -3.356  Telephone Mainlines per Capita  
(.037)*** (.061)*** (.051)*** (.145)*** (.175)*** (5.063)  (.559)*** (1.053)*** 
-.003  .011 .006 .031 .009 -.460  .033 -.306  Ln (GDP in US$) 
(.004) (.007) (.005) (.013)**  (.011) (.405) (.047) (.117)** 
.093 -.019  .366 -.021  .017 .065 .007 .158  Population (in 1000) per Sq Km 
(.007)*** (.006)*** (.012)*** (.010)**  (.010)*  (.215) (.036) (.054)*** 
N  97 97 88 88 43 43 54 54 
R-Squared  .83 .53 .96 .67 .57 .08 .68 .26 
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TABLE X 
Banking System Outreach and Firm Financing Obstacles – Cross Country Results 
 
Financial Obstacle variable based on World Business Environment Survey “Please judge on a four point scale how problematic is financing for the operation and growth of your business: 
1) No obstacle 2) Minor obstacle 3) Moderate obstacle 4) Major obstacle” Country score obtained by averaging individual score for each respondent by country. OLS estimation with robust 
standard errors performed: General Financing Obstacle = β0 + β1(Indicator1) + β2(Indicator2) + β3(Private Credit/GDP) + β4(Share of Businesses in Manufacturing Sector among Sample 
Respondents) + β5(Share of Businesses in Service Sector among Sample Respondents) + β6(Share of Foreign Businesses among Sample Respondents) + β7(Share of Export Businesses 
among Sample Respondents) + β8(Share of Businesses Owned by Government among Sample Respondents) + β9(Share of SMEs among Sample Respondents). Only β1, β2 and β3 shown. 
Definitions and data sources are in Appendix A.3 Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 10% level  ** Significant at 5% level  *** Significant at 1% level 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 -1.124  -.819         Geographic branch 
penetration   (.188)***  (.280)***        
 -.883  -.674         Demographic branch 
penetration   (.331)***  (.322)**        
   -.226  -.183       Geographic ATM 
penetration     (.037)***  (.055)***      
   -.624  -.494       Demographic ATM 
penetration     (.148)***  (.184)***      
     -.884  .073     Loans per capita 
     (.434)*  (.292)    
     .007  .018     Loan-income ratio 
     (.010)  (.008)**    
       -.089  .181  Deposits per capita 
       (.137)  (.157) 
       .014  .076  Deposit-income ratio 
       (.039)  (.033)** 
-.382   -.207   -.103   -.538   -.748  Private credit/GDP 
(.163)**   (.163)   (.184)   (.177)***   (.204)*** 
N  73 71 64 64 58 32 28 39 35 
R-Squared  .40 .44 .49 .50 .56 .42 .79 .28 .60   43 
 
TABLE XI 
Banking System Outreach and Firm Financing Obstacles – Firm Level Results 
 
Financial Constraint variable based on World Business Environment Survey “Please judge on a four point scale how problematic is financing for the operation and growth of your 
business: 1) No obstacle 2) Minor obstacle 3) Moderate obstacle 4) Major obstacle”  Ordered probit estimation with robust standard errors performed. Additional binary control variables 
(foreign ownership, government ownership, exporter, manufacturing, services, SME) included in regressions, but coefficients not shown below. Definitions and data sources are in 
Appendix A.3 Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 10% level  ** Significant at 5% level  *** Significant at 1% level 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 -1.352  -1.136         Geographic branch 
penetration   (.132)***  (.245)***        
 -.950  -.773         Demographic branch 
penetration   (.272)***  (.300)**        
   -.300  -.279       Geographic ATM 
penetration     (.020)***  (.048)***      
   -.728  -.678       Demographic ATM 
penetration     (.108)***  (.153)***      
     -1.045  -.901     Loans per capita 
     (.224)***  (.229)***    
     -.002  .006     Loan-income ratio 
     (.008)  (.007)    
       -.027  .004  Deposits per capita 
       (.115)  (.135) 
       .000  .019  Deposit-income ratio 
       (.022)  (.021) 
-.346   -.164   -.070   -.075   -.319  Private credit/GDP 
(.185)*   (.162)   (.162)   (.213)   (.252) 
N  6894 7029 6001 6566 5660 3439 2695 3975 3231 
Pseudo R-Squared  .02  .03  .03 .04 .04 .04 .04 .02 .02   44 
 
Table A.1. Indicator Data Appendix 
 
Country  Source  Data Current as of:  Comments 
Albania  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Argentina  Regulator Survey  December 2003  Housing loans, information provided separately, not included 
Armenia  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Australia  Regulator Survey  June 2003   
Austria Regulator  Survey 
 




Number of Loans and Value of Deposits reflect domestic loans and deposits only, Value of 
Loans and Number of Deposits reflects both domestic and foreign loans and deposits  
Number of ATMs: European Payment Cards 
Azerbaijan  National Bank of Azerbaijan 
Republic 
October 2004  Number of Branches: Bulletin of Banking Statistics - Table 4.1 Number of branches of 
operating credit organizations 
Bahrain  Regulator Survey  December 2002  Number of Branches current as of December 2003. Loan and deposit information for full 
commercial banks only 
Bangladesh  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Belarus  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Belgium  Regulator Survey  December 2002   
Belize  Central Bank of Belize  December 2003  Number of Branches: Quarterly Financial Information of Commercial Banks 
Bolivia Regulator  Survey 




Number of Loans actually reflects number of borrowers 
Number of ATMs: Payment System Statistics in Countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean 1997-2001 - Table 6: Cash Dispensers, ATMs and EFTPOS Terminals 
Bosnia  Regulator Survey  December 2004   
Botswana  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Brazil  Regulator Survey  June 2003  Number of Loans actually reflects number of borrowers 
Bulgaria  Regulator Survey  December 2002   
Canada  Bank for International 
Settlements 
Canadian Bankers Association 
December 2003  Number of Branches: Statistics on Payment and Settlement Systems in Selected Countries 
Figures for 2003 – Table 5: Institutional Framework 
Number of ATMs: ABM Market in Canada, May 2004 
Chile  Regulator Survey  December 2003   





Number of ATMs: “High Growth Special Situation” March 24, 2005 
Colombia  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Costa Rica  Centro de Estudios Monetarios 
Latinoamericanos 
December 2001  Number of Branches and Number of ATMs: Payment System Statistics in Countries of 
Latin America and the Caribbean 1997-2001 Table 4 – Institutional Framework and Table 6 
– Cash Dispensers, ATMs and EFTPOS Terminals 
Croatia  Regulator Survey  September 2004   
Czech Republic  Regulator Survey  December 2002   
Denmark  Regulator Survey  December 2002   
Dominican 
Republic 
Regulator Survey  December 2004  Number of Loans actually reflects number of borrowers 
Ecuador  Regulator Survey  December 2004   
Egypt  Central Bank of Egypt 
Egypt Ministry of 
Communications and 
Information Technology 
July 2003  Number of Branches: “Egyptian Banking Sector Reform Policy: Areas of Future Actions” 
Number of ATMs: “E-Business – A New Way of Doing Business” 
El Salvador  Regulator Survey  March 2004   
Estonia  Regulator Survey  December 2004   
Ethiopia  Ethiopian Consulate General 
California 
December 2001  Number of Branches: Country Facts 3.8 Financial Institutions 
Fiji  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Finland  Regulator Survey  December 2003  Number of Branches and Number of ATMs current as of December 2002 
France  Regulator Survey  December 2004  Number of ATMs current as of December 2003, Value of Loans, Number of Deposits, 
Value of Deposits current as of June 2004 






Number of Branches: Bulletin of Monetary and Banking Statistics January-February 2005, 
Table 3.1. Financial Institutions 
Number of ATMs: Julija Mosina “Lithuanian Representatives Visited Caucasian 
Countries”, September 22, 2003 
Germany  Regulator Survey  December 2002   
Ghana  Bank of Ghana  December 2001  Number of Branches: Major Banks Branches Network Nationwide 
Greece  Regulator Survey  December 2003  Number of ATMs current as of December 2002, Number of Loans, Value of Loans, 
Number of Deposits and Value of Deposits current as of January 2003 and reflect loans and 
deposits to domestic enterprises and households 
Guatemala Regulator  Survey 
Centro de Estudios Monetarios 
Latinoamericanos 
December 2003   
Number of Branches: Sistemas de Compensación y Liquidación de Pagos y Valores en 
Guatemala Junio 2004 – Table A4: Marco Institucional 
Guyana Regulator  Survey 




Number of Deposit Accounts: Payment System Statistics in Countries of Latin America and 
the Caribbean 1997-2001 – Table 4: Institutional Framework 
Honduras  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Hungary Regulator  Survey 
National Bank of Hungary 
December 2003   
Number of ATMs: Eva Keszy-Harmath “The Payment Card Business in Hungary 2003” 
India  Reserve Bank of India  June 2004  Number of Branches: Trend and Progress of Banking in India 2003-2004 November 29, 
2004 
Indonesia  Bank Indonesia  December 2001 
January 2005 
Number of Branches: Annual Report 2003, Table 8.1 
Number of ATMs: Offices of Financial Institutions and Cash Services – ATMs   45 
 
Table A.1. Indicator Data Appendix (continued) 
Country  Source  Data Current as of:  Comments 
Iran  Regulator Survey  December 2004   
Ireland  Regulator Survey  December 2004   
Israel Regulator  Survey     
Italy  Regulator Survey  December 2002   





Number of ATMs: Ulric Rindebro “Spain: Ahead of the ATM Curve” April 5, 2002 
Jordan  Regulator Survey  December 2002   
Kazakhstan  Bank for International 
Settlements 





Number of Branches: Payment Systems in Kazakhstan, Table 5: Institutional Framework  
Number of ATMs: Payment Cards, Table 2 
Kenya  Regulator Survey  December 2004   
Korea  Regulator Survey  December 2002   
Kuwait  Regulator Survey  December 2004   
Kyrgizstan Kyrgizstan 
Development Gateway 
November 2004  Number of Branches: List of Commercial Banks in the Kyrgyz Republic and their Branches 
Lebanon  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Lithuania  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Madagascar  Regulator Survey  December 2004   
Malaysia  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Malta  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Mauritius  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Mexico  Regulator Survey  December 2002   
Namibia  Regulator Survey  December 2003   




Number of Branches: Banking and Financial Statistics No. 43, Commercial Banks B9 
Number of ATMs: Binam Raj Ghimire “ATMs vs. Tellers: ATMs in Nepali Banks” 
Netherlands  Regulator Survey  December 2002   
New Zealand  Regulator Survey 





Number of Branches and Number of ATMs: Comparison of Payment Methods (Non-Cash) 2000-
2004 
Nicaragua  Regulator Survey  December 2004   
Nigeria  Central Bank of Nigeria  December 2003  Number of Branches: Major Economic, Financial and Banking Indicators, Table 2 – Financial 
and Banking Indicators 
Norway  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Pakistan  Regulator Survey  December 2004   
Panama  Regulator Survey  December 2004   
Papua New 
Guinea 
Regulator Survey  December 2004   
Peru  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Philippines  Regulator Survey  December 2002   
Poland  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Portugal  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Romania  Regulator Survey  December 2004   
Russia Regulator  Survey 





Number of ATMs: Russian Payment System 
Saudi Arabia  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Singapore  Regulator Survey  January 2005  Number of loans actually reflects number of borrowers 
Slovak Republic  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Slovenia  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
South Africa  Regulator Survey  December 2002   
Spain  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Sri Lanka  Central Bank of Sri 
Lanka 
December 2003  Number of Branches and Number of ATMs: Annual Report 2003 Section 10.8 and Table 10.12 
Sweden  Regulator Survey  December 2003  Number of Branches, Number of ATMs, Number of Deposits and Value of Deposits current as of 
December 2002 
Switzerland Regulator  Survey December  2002   
Tanzania Regulator  Survey 




Number of Branches: Registered Commercial Banks 
Thailand  Regulator Survey  December 2004   
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Turkey  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Uganda  Regulator Survey  September 2004   
Ukraine  US & Foreign 
Commercial Service 
February 2001  Number of ATMs: Olena Stephanska, David Hunter and Bela Babus “Card Payment Systems in 
Ukraine” 
United Kingdom  Regulator Survey  December 2002  Number of Branches and Number of ATMs current as of December 2001 







Number of Branches (FDIC-insured only): “Branching Continues to Thrive as the US Banking 
System Consolidates” October 20, 2004 
Number of ATMs: ATM Fact Sheet   46 
 
Table A.1. Indicator Data Appendix (continued) 
Country  Source  Data Current as of:  Comments 
Uruguay  Banco Central de 
Uruguay 
September 2004  Number of Branches: Superintendencia de Instituciones de Intermediación Financiera Red Física 
de las Empresas de Intermediación Financiera Número de Sucursales 
Venezuela Regulator  Survey 






Number of ATMs: Payment System Statistics in Countries of Latin America and the Caribbean 
1997-2001 – Table 6: Cash Dispensers, ATMs and EFTPOS Terminals 
West Bank and 
Gaza 
Regulator Survey  April 2005   
Zambia  Regulator Survey  December 2003   
Zimbabwe  Regulator Survey  December 2004  Number of ATMs current as of April 2005 
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TABLE A.2 
Financial, Economic and Geographic Country Characteristics– Summary Statistics 
 
Definitions and data sources in Table A.3. 
 
Variable Mean  Median  Standard Deviation  Minimum  Maximum  N 
Population Density  195.64  74.52 667.66  2.45  6,967.21  115 
Ln  (GDP)  24.28 23.99 2.06  20.42 30.02 115 
Telephone Mainlines per Capita  .22 .14 .21 .00 .74 114 
Rail Km per 100 Sq Km Area  2.70  1.66  2.95  .05  12.29  73 
GDP per Capita  8,268.61  2,453.97  11,736.27 96.74  48,591.84 115 
Governance  Index  .06 -.17  .92 -1.59  1.92  115 
Barriers to Economic Freedom  2.96 3  .68  1.68 4.63 112 
Cost to Enforce Contract (Percent  of  Debt)  23.76 17.60 22.82 4.20  136.50  105 
Credit  Information  Index  3.32  4 2.02  0 6 104 
Restrictions of Banks’ Activities  5.86  6  2.44  0  12  96 
Entry  into  Banking  Requirements  7.33  8 1.29  0 8 98 
Share of Assets in Government-Owned  Banks  .15 .07 .21 0  .96 91 
Share of Assets in Foreign-Owned Banks  .37  .24  .31  0  1  86 
Concentration  .68 .66 .19 .25 1  111 
Private  Credit  /  GDP  .50 .35 .41 .02 1.63  101 
Liquid Liabilities / GDP  .51 .45 .36 .05 1.90  90 
Total Deposits / GDP  .61 .43 .63 .00 4.06  101 
Overhead Costs / Total Assets  .05 .04 .03 .01 .11 111 
Net Interest Margin   .06 .05 .03 .01 .18 111   48 
 
Table A.3. –Data Appendix – Definition and Sources 
 
Variable Definition  Source  Date 
Population  Total Population  World Bank World Development Indicators 2003 
GDP  GDP in US Dollars at Market Exchange Rates  World Bank World Development Indicators 2003 
Land Area  Total Land Area in Square Kilometers  World Bank World Development Indicators 2003 
Exchange Rate  Market Exchange Rate in US Dollars  International Monetary Fund International 
Financial Statistics 
2003 
Population Density  Total Population / Total Land Area  World Bank World Development Indicators 2003 
Ln (GDP)  Natural Log of GDP in US Dollars at Market Exchange Rates  World Bank World Development Indicators 2003 
Telephone Mainlines 
per Capita 
Total Telephone Mainlines / Total Population  World Bank World Development Indicators 2002 
Rail Km per 100 Sq 
Km Area 
Total Route Km Rail Lines / Total Land Area in 100 Square 
Kilometers 
World Bank World Development Indicators 2002 
GDP per Capita  GDP in US Dollars at Market Exchange Rates / Total 
Population 
World Bank World Development Indicators 2003 
Governance Index  Average Score on Six Governance Indicators (Voice and 
Accountability, Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, 
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, Control of Corruption) – 
Data from Surveys of Enterprises, Citizens and Experts. High 
score corresponds to better governance. 
World Bank Aggregate Governance 
Indicators 
2004 
Barriers to Economic 
Freedom 
Average Score of 10 Variables Scored on 1-5 Scale, Score 
Increasing With Barriers, Based on Factors Relating to Property 
Rights, Banking Freedom, Wages and Prices, Capital Flows 
and Foreign Investment, Regulation, Informal Market, Trade 
Policy, Fiscal Burden of Government, Government Intervention 
in the Economy and Monetary Policy 





Scored on 0-6 Scale, Score Increasing with Availability of 
Credit Information, 
World Bank Doing Business Indicators  2004 
Restrictions of 
Banks’ Activities 
Sum of Restrictions on Banks Owning Real Estate, Insurance, 
Securities, and Non-Financial Firms 




Entry into Banking 
Requirements 
Number of Requirements for Banking License (0-8): Draft By-
Laws, Organizational Chart, Financial Projection, Financial 
Information for Main Shareholder(s), Directors’ Background 
and Experience, Managers’ Background and Experience, 
Sources of Funds and Market Differentiation 




Cost to Enforce 
Contract (Percent of 
Debt) 
Total Enforcement Cost, Including Legal Fees, Assessment, 
Court Fees 
World Bank Doing Business Indicators  2004 
Share of Assets in 
Government-Owned 
Banks 
Percentage of Banking System Assets in Banks 50%+ Owned 
by Government 




Share of Assets in 
Foreign-Owned 
Banks 
Percentage of Banking System Assets in Banks 50%+ Owned 
by Foreign Entities 




Concentration  Assets of Three Largest Banks as Percentage of Total Bank 
Assets 
World Bank Financial Structure and 
Economic Development Database 
5 Year Average 
1999-2003 
Liquid Liabilities / 
GDP 
Liquid Liabilities as a Share of GDP  World Bank Financial Structure and 
Economic Development Database 
5 Year Average 
1999-2003 
Total Deposits / GDP Total Deposits as a Share of GDP  International Monetary Fund International 
Financial Statistics 
2003 
Private Credit / GDP  Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks and Other Financial 
Institutions as a Share of GDP 
World Bank Financial Structure and 
Economic Development Database 
5 Year Average 
1999-2003 
Overhead Costs / 
Asset Value 
Accounting Value of Overhead Costs as a Share of Total Bank 
Assets 
World Bank Financial Structure and 
Economic Development Database 
5 Year Average 
1999-2003 
Net Interest Margin   Accounting Value of Net Interest Revenue as a Share of 
Interest-Bearing (Total Earning) Assets 
World Bank Financial Structure and 
Economic Development Database 
5 Year Average 
1999-2003 
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Figure 1: Median Geographic Branch Penetration 
























Figure 2: Median Demographic Branch Penetration 
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Figure 3: Median Geographic ATM Penetration 
























Figure 4: Median Demographic ATM Penetration 
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Figure 5: Median Loans per Capita 
























Figure 6: Median Loan-Income Ratio 
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Figure 7: Median Deposits per Capita 
























Figure 8: Median Deposit-Income Ratio 
(By GDP per Capita Quintile 1=Lowest, 5= Highest) 
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